Elite Networks: The Political Economy of Inequality, forthcoming @Oxford University Press
A book about political power and inequality, showing how the collusion between political and corporate interests affects the distribution of incomes in society. Its most important goal is to offer a novel perspective on the long-run origins of inequality by introducing the concept of elite networks and examining its impact on the distribution of power and incomes.
"Granting votes: Exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data" (with Josip Glaurdić), April 2017, Public Choice 171(1): 223–241.doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0435-y
"To Invest or Not to Invest, That is the Question: Analysis of Firm Behavior Under Anticipated Shocks" (with Dejan Kovač, Nikola Kleut, and Boris Podobnik), August 2016, PLoS ONE 11(8): e0158782. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158782
"Does the Wage Gap between Private and Public Sectors Encourage Political Corruption?" (with Boris Podobnik and H. Eugene Stanley), November 2015, PLoS ONE 10(10): e0141211. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0141211
"Je li Županov imao pravo? Testiranje podrijetla i perzistencije egalitarnog sindroma" (with Aleksandar Štulhofer and Ivan Burić), June 2017, Društvena Istraživanja, 26(2): 207-225. doi: 10.5559/di.26.2.04 (Was Županov Right? Testing the Origin and Persistence of the Egalitarian Syndrome)
"When politicians collude with firms. The impact of elite networks on inequality." University of Oxford, Successfully defended in April 2019, available at the Oxford University Research Archive.
Other (Book chapters, research reports, essays)
"Political Economy of Corruption, Clientelism, and Vote-Buying in Croatian Local Government" in Petak and Kotarski (eds.) Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
"The Euro Crisis in the Periphery: Patterns of Contagion, Imported Instabilities, and Political Turmoil" in Central and South Eastern Europe 2017, 17th edition, London, Routledge, 2016.
Elite networks and inequality: Political connections and personal networks among top corporate income earners, March 2018 (3rd PhD paper)
Corruption and resource misallocation: Can corruption explain the productivity decline during the Great Recession? (with Jurica Zrnc), March 2017
Persistent electoral success with endogenous rents: Can politicians extract rents and still stay in power?, 2015 (most recent version here)
Paper presented at the 50th annual Public Choice Society Conference in New Orleans, March 2013
My interests range from political economy (public choice theory) to new institutional economics, behavioral economics, and economic history (how societies and their institutions evolve over time). In the vast field of political economy I am primarily focused on public choice theory and how interest group behavior (the logic of collective action) and the logic of political power shape economic outcomes. I believe that one cannot truly grasp the meaning of economic interactions and relationships without understanding the basic principles of political economy. In other words, you cannot understand economics if you don't understand politics. Which is why my research interests are interdisciplinary. I believe in the power of institutional design to shape human interaction. I believe that people react to incentives and are guided by both rational and emotional responses to such incentives. Clear institutional rules must be at the forefront of a democratic society. I believe in the principles of liberty, both economic and personal. I believe in the rule of law and private property rights. If such rules lack, incentives become perverse and a democracy quickly descends into cronyism, oligarchy and even totalitarianism. It is in the lack of coherent and clear institutional incentives coupled with the lack of political freedom (whilst maintaining a perception of free choice) that all modern problems arise from; from inequality to corporatism, from protectionism to an unsustainable welfare state, from inefficient governments to inefficient markets.
I believe economics is a science when it applies a scientific, experimental method (randomized trial), but I also realize that many economists aren't scientists as they get preoccupied with aggregate variables and cherry-picking economic policy. In my opinion an economic policy should only be implemented if it is confirmed by rigorous scientific fact, not politicians' fiction. After all, one of the greatest lessons of economics, which many fail to understand is the following: “The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.” H.Hazlitt, 1946
It is through those lenses that I tend to think about economics and human interaction.
I (used to) blog about economics and many of the issues mentioned above on a semi-regular basis. Access the blog here.